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Changing Neighbourhood Dynamics: 
An analysis of the European Union leverage 
on the Palestinian  National Authority 




Since the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, the European Union has 
adopted a diplomatic mediating role in the region, highlighting that the resolution of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is key to the development of the region. The European Union, as 
an international actor, has been committed to improving the humanitarian and economic 
situation of the Palestinian National Authority (PA) by the support of principles of building 
the institutions of a democratic, independent and viable Palestinian state, living in peace 
and security with Israel.  The EU relations with the PNA have become more visible since 
the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 due to stronger EU peace-keeping and 
development efforts through agreements and the formation of the “Quartet”. The EU has 
participated in bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to support the creation of a 
democratic PA. The European Union has influenced the PA to different extents. There have 
been clear boundaries to the full effectiveness of EU conditionality on the PA due to the 
nature of the agreements per se and due to the sui generis nature of the diplomatic relations 
between the EU and the PA. The advent of Hamas victory brings a new face to the EU-PA 
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This thesis outlines the European Union leverage on the Palestinian Authority. According to 
the Presidency Conclusions of the Council of the European Union in 2004, the EU is still 
committed to promote political reform, good governance, democracy and human rights in 
the Middle East. At first, I will give an overview of the EU policies and objectives towards 
the Palestinian National Authority, keeping the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in context. I will, 
then, analyze the instruments that the EU utilizes in order to reach the reform goals in the 
PA region, the difficulties of implementation of the objectives and reasons for the less than 
ideal outcomes. I will analyze EU influence on the PA and following, how this influence is 
changing in the advent of Hamas. I will, finally, identify possible future outcomes for the 
altering situation. 
II.   EU objectives towards the Palestinian National Authority 
 
 
The first pillar of the EU policy towards Israel and Palestine is the need to respect the 
collective rights of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples.  From vague support of Palestinian 
self-determination in the 1980 Venice declaration until the assertion of the creation of a 
democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian state, the EU has been supporting the 
two-state solution in order to also to guarantee Israel’s security. (Tocci 2001). With the start 
of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the voicing for a two-state solution became even louder through the 
formation of the Quartet and the pushing for domestic reforms inside the PA. (Tocci 2001).  
The second pillar of EU goals has been the importance of respecting human rights and 
promotion of democracy. The EU has always condemned terrorism and has affirmed that 
solutions for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict need to be found within the boundaries of 
international law. The European Union is committed to improving the humanitarian and 
economic situation of the Palestinians, whilst at the same time supporting the Roadmap 
principles of building the institutions of a democratic, independent and viable Palestinian 
state, living in peace and security with Israel.  
 
After the clear failure of the Oslo process with the start of the second Intifada in 2000, the 
world has been watching the two-state solution even further from happening along with 
violation of human rights, democracy and international law. Israel has been found 
responsible for excessive use of force and strong restrictions such as closures and curfews. 
Moreover, there has been a high level of construction connecting Israeli settlements. In 
2002, Israeli government started the construction of a wall in order for de facto annexation 
of occupied territory. However, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has found the wall-
building illegal in July 2004. Palestinian militant groups have targeted Israeli civilians 
within Israel. The responsible groups were found to be Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, the 
Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. Suicide 
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bombings are illegal under the Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions. Therefore, the EU, 
since 2003, along with the other members of the Quarter considers these groups terrorist 
organizations (U.S. State Department, 2003) However, the Conventions refer to state and 
state-like actors. This is a difficulty in this case because there has been no proof that the PA 
has sponsored illegal activities. (Human Rights Watch, 2002)  Even though the PA is does 
not act as a state, it is considered to be a state-like actor and is often held accountable for 
the prevention and punishment of such actions. 
 
The EU became more involved in the Palestinian Authority issues due to disconnected 
events. The EU is highly interested in the region due to geographic proximity. The historical 
ties are strong with the Jews as well as with Arabs. The high Arab and Muslim immigration 
into the EU is also an important factor for the involvement and the interest in the Muslim 
Mediterranean. France, Spain and Italy have been involved in the Maghreb due to colonial 
history. Moreover, Germany still suffers from the World War II guilt therefore, it maintains 
delicate relations with Israel. 
 
The last enlargement caused a lot of preoccupation with the new EU “border”. The new 
neighbour countries brought new preoccupations. The larger the EU becomes, the closer it 
becomes to the Israel/Palestine region. Moreover, the rise of radical Islam, the Iraqi War 
and outbreak of the second Intifada in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict drew attention to the 
Middle East.  
 
 Since the beginning of the second Intifada, the EU has become more preoccupied with 
Israel’s constructing of the barrier separating the Israeli and PA territories and with the 
promotion of democracy, governance, and reform within the Palestinian Authority (Tocci 
2001). 
 
III.  The deployment of EU tools 
 
The EU enjoys categorically different relations with the parties in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Since the mid-1990s the Union has had an association relationship with Israel and 
the PA. In the case of Israel, association has been wide through economic trade and 
liberalization, while in the case of the PA it has been in forms of high levels of aid. The 
Union’s contractual ties with non-candidate countries, both Israel and the PA rank high on 
the EU’s list of priorities, judging by the relationship that both parties enjoy. The high 
internationalization of the conflict may also be a reason for such involvement.  
 
 
Agreements and Processes 
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or Barcelona process was the previous agreement for 
between the EU and the region that covered the Israel/Palestine. and  had not brought about 
large changes. A new push was appropriate due to the new reality of the EU. Most of the 
negotiations were in bilateral manners and strong conditionality was hardly achieved.  A 
positive solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is key for the overall development of the 
Mashreq area. With financial assistance to the PA as the main incentive to the PA, the main 
goal behind the partnership was economic liberalization and promotion of trade in line with 
the IMF. Not a whole lot was planned about the ways to promote human rights. Benefits 
were often threatened to be annulled however, the EU did little to ensure reforms. 
Therefore, society’s main problems were not fixed. Even though the EMP had not been very 
successful, there is no doubt that resources and competence had been more prominent. The 
Barcelona process, as a cooperative partnership, has not had negative rebounds. Therefore, 
the EU  had an incentive to stay involved in the development of the PA since there was 
legitimacy and non-negative results.  The EU then created the European Neighborhood 
Policy to enforce the details and conditionality of the Association Agreements. (Presidency 
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Conclusions 2004)  
 
The EU has constructed a set of policies for the neighbourhood as a well-defined new 
geopolitical space. This consists of the whole of Europe and the Mediterranean basin. The 
states in this area come in three categories for the EU policy-maker. First, the EU dealt with 
the   accession candidates. Second, there is the Western Balkan states for whom accession is 
a longterm goal. The EU has grouped theses states in the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements. Finally, the official ‘neighbours’ of the former Soviet Union and the 
Mediterranean were grouped under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). All three 
groups have the same normative foundations, with only differences in the intensity of 
pressures and incentives for compliance with EU values, norms and standards. In all cases, 
the policy documents give first place to the objective of convergence on democratic values 
and the rule of law. For accession, full compliance is mandatory. The Western Balkans 
states are set on a course that makes full compliance necessary in order to reach 
membership, but with much more flexibility on the time sequence. For the ENP states, the 
same broad objectives are given, but compliance is more flexible and selective. Nonetheless 
the Commission has followed the same comprehensive normative framework for all three 
categories.. 
 
The agreements were created in a path-dependent manner. Due to the success in reforming 
the first group or the accession countries, the ENP was created by the Directorate-General 
for Enlargement of the EU. (Emerson and Noutcheva 2005) Even though the ENP stated no 
membership prospects, the format is similar to the Copenhagen Criteria in the Accession 
Agreements between the EU and Central and Eastern European countries. As in the 
accession negotiations, the process is bilateral and different rules apply to different partners. 
Even though, the ENP affirms clearly that this was not a membership prospective, it was 
written in the same format as the accession negotiations. The political criteria are similar 
and both are based on human rights, rule of law and democracy values. There are specific 
differences in the agendas of each country, however the main ideas are similar.  
 
The ENP introduced more direct norms. The main difference on the objective from the 
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Euro- Mediterranenan Partnership is that the ENP states that human rights, democracy and 
rule of law should be similar to that of the EU (European Commission 2004b). The Action 
plans are supposed to add to the Association Agreements and Barcelona Process. In the 
same way as the past agreements, the ENP states that if rules are broken, “appropriate 
measures” will be taken.  Suspending the agreement was never done in the case of the PA in 
the Barcelona process, however it is clearly stated again in the ENP. 
 
The vagueness of the requisites in the Neighborhood and Assessment Agreements raised 
some challenges however, the specificities of the ENP became a first basis on how to utilize 
EU conditions for the delivery of assistance, The acquis communautaire is specific, whereas 
the agreements with the PA are often unclear on how the reforms should take place.  
However, in this aspect, the EU has increasingly become more preoccupied with the stances 
of the PA. (Sayigh and Shikaki 1999) The EU goals were then, complemented by the 
recommendations of the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2001, along with numerous 
Palestinian NGOs and the 100-day reform plan approved in June 2002. Precise conditions 
and IMF monitoring were set for the disbursement of EU budgetary assistance. In 
particular, EU conditions called for greater transparency in public finances through the 
consolidation of all revenues in a single IMF monitored account, a halt on public-sector 
hiring, the adoption on a Law on the Independence of the Judiciary and the passing and 
preliminary application of the Basic Law. A further step forward was made in the EU-PA 
Action Plan. The Action Plan goes far in specifying the “priorities for action” in the areas of 
democracy, human rights, the judiciary, the legal system, the fiscal and security sectors, 
institutions and administrative capability (European Commission 2004f). Greater clarity in 
the reform objectives, to be monitored through EU-PA sub-committees, bode well for the 
effectiveness of conditionality towards the Palestinians. 
 
There have been voiced attempts, that are often hard to accomplish, from the EU to focus 
on trade and give preference to Palestinian products, firstly during the Oslo process and the 
EC-PLO Interim Association Agreement. This has been used as a framework for future 
trade liberalization. An effective policy of conditionality targeted at a non-state actor would 
need to distinguish between those reform priorities that the PA can and should meet, the 
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priorities that require Israeli cooperation and those that need external support. Making such 
distinctions in practice is no simple feat. Measuring relative capability is not only open to 
subjective interpretation, but also requires continuous review in view of changing 
circumstances. To ease this task, however, is the fact that relative to cases of sovereign 
statehood, the Palestinian context is highly open and internationalized. As such, acquiring 
the necessary information for the specification of conditions and benchmarks may prove 
easier than in contexts of sovereign statehood. For example, in Turkey, it was not until 
recent years that international NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch were able to operate freely in the country. 
 
 
It is difficult to ignore that many of the reforms of the PA would need the consent and help 
of Israel. Since Israel is the United States’ partner, it means that there is a large field of 
influence before the PA can actually act on something. The EU-Israel Action plan, on the 
other hand, has been far more vague with “facilitating efforts to resolve the Middle East 
conflict, strengthening the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, promoting 
the respect for human rights, improving the dialogue between cultures and religions, 
cooperating in the fight against anti-Semitism, racism and xenophobia” (European 
Commission (2004e)). It is clear that without further elaboration, these statements could not 
amount to credible conditions and would at best become subjects for discussion within 
political dialogue. This indeed appears to be the intention of the Neighbourhood Policy vis-
à-vis Israel. 
 
Conditionality and incentives  
 
It is key to understand the format of the agreements in order to evaluate EU’s leverage on 
the PA. There are different ways in which the EU delivers benefits through the fulfillment 
of obligations. In the case of the PA, the contractual ties are based on ex post conditionality, 
rather than ex ante. (Tocci 2001) This means that the PA needs to maintain and respect the 
set of rules on the contract, otherwise the contract is lawfully annulled. On the other hand, 
in an ex ante conditionality example, the EU will deliver the benefits when conditions are 
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met by the other party. The Copenhagen criteria, adopted in the conclusions of the 
European Council meeting in Copenhagen in June 1993, through the acquis communautaire 
is an example of the latter since the domestic reforms are incentives for accession to the 
Union. In the case of the association agreements with ex-post conditionality, the EU has 
been able to influence reforms within the PA, however, the reforms have been superficial at 
times cosmetic reforms, rather than long-lasting deep reforms.   
 
The EU’s involvement on the Palestinians issues has been  high since the launch of the 
ENP. In economic terms, the EU and the member-states represented by far the largest donor 
to the Palestinian Authority. Without EU aid since 2000, the PA could have collapsed. 
Palestinian political dependence on the EU has also been high. Like Israelis, Palestinians 
frequently accuse Europe of its ineffective political role in the Middle East.Unlike Israelis, 
however, Palestinians appear to have welcomed more European involvement in the conflict. 
This can be seen as an invitation to participate in the resolution of the conflict. 
 
The ENP, in which both Israel and the PA are included, in principle, aims at blurring the 
lines separating EU inclusion and exclusion. But to date, the policy falls far short of this 
objective. In addition, particularly when it comes to the Palestinians, the additional benefits, 
besides aid, envisaged within the ENP are hardly evident. 
 
The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner. Israel’s political dependence on Europe is far 
more controversial. Israel’s strategic relationship with the United States has also shadowed 
the murky political ties with the EU. However, Israel is an EU’s neighbor, it is surrounded 
by real and perceived enemies whereas the US remains on the other side of the Atlantic. 
Moreover, some member states of the EU have special relationships with Israel. Beyond the 
rhetoric, Israel’s political links to Europe are valued highly and the desire of finding a place 
of belonging is deeply embedded in Israeli society. (Tocci 2001) 
 
Although Israel enjoys highly developed ties with the EU, it is not included in the customs 
union, it does not enjoy the relationships characterizing members of the European 
Economic Area and it does not currently have any prospects of entering the accession 
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process. Israel seems to be part of Europe only during the Eurovision song contests and for 
UEFA matches.  The PA, besides the large sums of aid received , are even further away in 
terms of their degree of integration into the EU. Even the provisions for preferential trade 
included in their Association Agreement remain largely unimplemented. 
IV. The assessment of EU leverage 
 
 
Through the Neighborhood Policy, the EU has bee able to promote a wide range of reforms. 
The PA benefited and became dependent on EU budgetary transfers, especially after 2002 
that Israel halted tax transfers to the PA prohibiting Palestinians to work inside Israel (Tocci 
2003). The EU threatened to cancel the aid if reforms were not made in the public and fiscal 
sector. It was at this time that monitoring of budgetary aid transfers was implemented and 
the judicial system was reformed. The EU was able to have  influence on this aspect. 
 
In response to internal and external pressures, the PA launched a reform program in order to 
strengthen democracy, governance and legitimization. In the case of the Palestinian 
Authority, the large section of the population was dissatisfied with the PA leadership. The 
population resented the high corruption, inefficiency and failure to deliver peace and better 
standard of living. Therefore, as stated in the EU-PA Action Plan in 2000, the PA did launch 
a process of reform in 2002, aimed at strengthening good governance and democracy. In 
2002, the Basic Law was adopted, and in 2003 the law was reformed in order to allow for a 
prime ministerial post. A Law on the Independence of the Judiciary was passed. Significant 
progress was made in the management of the PA’s finances, thus curbing the potential for 
corruption. It is true that some reforms were only exterior. (Emerson and Noutcheva 2005) 
In 2003, the creation of the prime minister’s post did not come with valuable 
empowerment, as most control remained in the president’s hands. Even with the 
rearrangement of the cabinet, the changes were mostly aesthetic. In the fiscal sector, the late 
President Yasser Arafat retained approximately 8% of the budget and clientelism was a 
strong characteristic of the PA (Tocci 2005). Besides the corrupted legacy of the reformed 
PA, the EU still was able to exert some leverage in the case of domestic reforms. 
 
The death of Yaser Arafat opened the space for a reshaping of Palestinian domestic politics 
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through new elections and an enhanced dialogue with the Islamic parties. Since Arafat’s 
successor Mahmoud Abbas, stepped into power, a more legitimate process of reform started 
to take place. There had been a greater empowerment of the prime minister, with President 
Abbas and Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia sharing powers between them. As recognised by 
the international community at the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee in Rome in December 2003, 
“EU budgetary support and its conditions as well as US support, has over the past years 
been successful in advancing key reform measures such as financial 
accountability”.(European Commission 2005). Therefore, the European Union established 
an IMF full-monitoring process of the aid distribution and allocation inside the PA. Greater 
transparency in PA public finances through the control of the president’s funds are still in 
progress and the security sector is undergoing a systematic process of reform 
 
The successes of the early days in Mahmoud Abbas’s presidency were evident on most 
fronts. Nevertheless, without underestimating these steps, the reform process hit a wall. 
Dialogue between the Palestinian factions enhanced and improved, opening the prospects 
for the Islamic parties’ co-optation into the political system and an ensuing narrowing of 
polarizations within Palestinian politics. Due to less than immediate result of the benefits of 
the new reforms, the population had not yet seen meaningful changes in security and 
standards of living. Moreover, the positive changes during Mahmoud Abbas’ government 
were independent from the evolving dynamics within the Islamic parties. This resulted in 
the Hamas victory in parliamentary elections on April 7, 2006. The PA, which received 
considerable financial assistance from the European Union as well as from the United 
States was forced to face the suspension of all direct aid as it had been threatened in January 
2006 in case of success of a terrorist group in the elections.  
 
Nonetheless, several issues deriving from the sui generis situation of the Palestinians 
bedevil the task of EU conditionality. First of all, the case of the PA differs from other 
actors in the association agreements. The PA does not have full self-determination and is 
only a state-like actor, not a state.  Moreover, the conflict is different because as an identity-
based conflict, the two-state solution is the one that has been accepted by the majority of 
the international community and even both Israel and Palestine. Israel rejects the one-state 
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solution as other larger states in an identity-based conflict usually support, since it goes 
against the Zionist project. This is quite unusual, for both the secessionist party and the 
larger party to accept a two-state solution. The plurality of domestic actors and the inability 
of the PA to exercise full control hardens the process of negotiations. Moreover, due to the 
lack of a sovereign state with self-determination and the limited capability of the PA, the 





Lessons from Central and Eastern Europe 
 
The European Union leverage on the process of democratization in the post-communist 
countries has been concrete and real, however less substantial in the case of the PA.  The 
European Union has had a large impact on democratization in post-authoritarian societies in 
Central and Eastern Europe, during the transition from communism to democracy.  
However, most of the credit in the reconciliation of the situation can be granted to the 
European Union. The prospect of European membership and the process of meeting the 
criteria for membership have been successful in establishing incentives for aspiring 
members to promote domestic reforms. The European Union exertion of leverage has been 
key to the process of democratic consolidation in the Central and Eastern European 
countries.      
 
Milada Vachudova argues that asymmetric interdependence, enforcement and meritocracy 
are three characteristics that enforce the active leverage of European Union. Asymmetric 
interdependence describes the little economic and political dependence that the EU had on 
the candidate countries compared to the much larger dependence that the candidate 
countries had on the EU to succeed economically and politically. Enforcement refers the 
European Union’s interest in making sure that candidate countries do comply with all the 
membership requirements of the Acquis Communautaire.  Meritocracy refers to the idea 
that candidates will be granted EU membership based on individual ability, achievement 
and compliance to the Acquis. The fear of exclusion in the next wave of enlargement plays 
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a large role in the pre-accession process strengthening even more asymmetric 
interdependence and enforcement. Active leverage is the conditionality exerted on 
candidate countries and is exerted in various ways. The benefit of EU membership was key 
to the domestic reforms in countries in the 2004 enlargement (Vachudova 2005).   
   
The PA shares some characteristics with the Central and Eastern European countries. There 
is clear asymmetric interdependence between the EU and the PA. The PA has depended on 
EU financial assistance and on the EU political involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Enforcement and meritocracy have a different face in this case. The EU has 
enforced some agreement requirements, but not others. There has been an 
institutionalization of the EU’s role in the PA, however, there has not been a strong 
enforcement of the rules of the contract as in the case of the Central and Eastern European 
countries. The EU controls the allocation of the financial assistance in different ways, 
however it has not enforced compliance of human right rules as it did in the CEEC’s. In the 
case of the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria, for example, the EU well controlled the 
minority rights issue through the enforcement of the Acquis Communitaire through detailed 
auditing of the situation. In the case of Turkey, for example, that has started accession 
negotiations with the EU, the Commission is highly enforcing the acquis communitaire as 
positive conditionality for accession into the EU  The EU however, does not act on 
meritocracy on the case of the PA since there are no clear future benefits stated in the 
agreements.. On the contrary, it utilizes negative conditionality on the PA.  
 
The concepts of passive leverage and active leverage have been key to the progress of 
democratic consolidation.  The consolidation of democracy in the post-communist countries 
was an arduous process changing the shape of the institutions and society. The interplay of 
external factors along with internal factors are key to understand the process of democratic 
institutionalization. Vachudova argues in her theory of active leverage that the most 
important external factor in the process of democratization in the new members of the EU 
was the prospective of joining the Union. Post-communist states reformed in order to 
follow pre-accession for the EU and meet criteria eligibility.  
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The Copenhagen Criteria which covers the country’s ability to assume EU’s membership 
was held in 1993 and stated that membership requires that candidate country has achieved 
stability of institutions, guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
protection for minorities (Vachudova 2005).  These conditions have been given attention on 
the reports from the European Commission.  This can well be explained with Vachudova’s 
idea of asymmetric interdependence since the standards can be higher for membership of 
candidate countries since the fear of exclusion is high.  
 
The difference with the conditionality with Accession Partnerships and any agreement 
between the EU and the PA is the characteristic of the conditionality per se. The Central and 
Eastern European countries have experienced the EU taking back the prospects of 
membership. The laggards Romania and Bulgaria will only join in 2007 due to less than 
ideal domestic reforms. The EU has proved that Accession Agreements are real and 
credible. 
 
The people of the post-communist countries participated in the domestic reforms through 
democratic forms. It appears that the median voter in the reforming countries were not 
directly affected by this leverage since there was a sustained alternation of power between 
opposition parties. Voting for the most democratic leader would be a way of subsuming to 
this EU leverage. However, the constraints of the institutions made a democratic choice 
difficult in the first elections after the fall of Communism. The people wished for the 
“Return to Europe” however, the parties in power still had Communist characteristics and it 
took a while for these countries to allow certain parties to rise. Vachudova explains that 
rent-seeking elites made the process of democratization difficult in the post-communist 
countries (Vachudova 2005).  The rent-seeking elites did not evaporate overnight. The same 
is happening in the Palestinian Authority. The victory of Hamas in the 2006 election proves 
that there is a step towards democracy if alternation of parties is a positive sign towards the 
institutionalization of democracy.   
 
The EU has been better at using its conditionality than its socialization in the case of the 
PA. For the Eastern European countries, membership prospective is real. Therefore, 
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socialization is more prominent. Since the countries know that they will be joining the EU 
at some point, the people have slowly adopted EU’s styles. The institutions and civil 
societies slowly become more similar to those of the EU members (Emerson and 
Noutcheva 2005). In the case of the ENP agreement with the PA, the EU has not specified 
future. Furthermore, the PA is still under the conflict which was not the case of the Central 
and Eastern European countries. Moreover, the cultural gap is colossal between the PA and 
the EU in comparison with the gap between the latter and the Central and Eastern European 
countries.   
 
According to Pridham, democratic conditionality was really developed in the 1990’s with 
respect to post-communist states that were to focus on the implementation of democratic 
conditionality. Due to the youth and fragility of these post-communist democracies, there is 
much leftover from communist regimes in terms of concentration of the power in the hands 
of the elites. The impacts of democratization due to European Union integration possibility 
occurs rapidly in candidate countries, however, the remaking of the political culture takes a 
long time until it becomes institutionalized democracy (Pridham 2002) 
 
Schimmelfenig argues that “democratic conditionality” is key to induce candidate countries 
to promote changes towards democracy. Schimmelfenig describes that “reinforcement by 
reward” is what leads countries to comply or reform in order to receive the reward offered 
by an international organization that does not coerce the potential candidate country 
(Schimmelfenig 2003). Reinforcement by reward groups the concepts of enforcement and 
meritocracy that Vachudova presents. The Palestinian Authority does not enjoy the same 
benefits as the CEC’s do since there is no reward perspective. Precisely. The EU has 
attempted to utilize positive conditionality on the PA. The 2003 Wider Europe 
communication affirmed that “in return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values 
and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms…the EU’s 
neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer integration with the EU”. 
(European Commission 2003). However, neither has the PA nor Israel have had any 
membership prospects for the EU. Israel’s statements have showed intentions of joining the 
Union (Tocci, 2).   The meeting of the Copenhagen criteria would result in severe minority 
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rights reforms within the state of Israel. The reforms would go against the Zionist project, 
however, could be changed in prospect of membership. 
 
In the Accession Agreements, but not in the European Neighborhood Policy, there is an 
active role of the candidate countries in the attempt to become European.  The 
institutionalization of the European level of rule of law, human rights, good governance and 
democracy is a process. The speed of the process of the EU’s contractual ties and the 
conditionalities that may come with them depends pivotally on the benefits on offer and the 
costs of compliance with contractual obligations. Only if the potential gains relative to the 
costs are perceived to be sufficiently high, could the Union meaningfully attempt to exert 
some form of influence on the PA.  
 
V. EU leverage after Hamas 
 
Accession clearly ranks higher than association or neighbourhood.  The characteristic of the 
Association Agreements that the EU has with Palestine have a ex-post conditionality. This 
means that the benefit is delivered as long as the rules are followed. If there is a violation of 
the agreement rules by the PA, the EU holds the right of the immediate suspension of 
benefits. However, the EU had not utilized this ex-post conditionality until the cut of 
assistance to the PA after the advent of Hamas victory in January 2006. 
 
The EU has made its conditionality more credible after the halt of aid to the PA and proving 
that it does enforce the rules on the contractual ties. Moreover, the characteristics of the 
rules in the processes, if negative conditionality was to be applied in more occasions, the 
agreements themselves would not have been signed in the first place since none of the 
countries in the Association Agreements and Neighborhood Policy usufruct from splendid 
democracies or human rights history. 
 
It took many years for the EU to utilize its negative conditionality. Before the cut of aid, EU 
had not sanctioned or put embargoes neither on the PA nor in Israel. (European Commission 
2004) Since both have broken rules of the human rights clause, there might be a chance that 
the EU had taken a more constructive role, enforcing promotion of values through 
communication and support as in the principle of socialization. Therefore, there have been 
reforms due to this gentle EU pressure however, the objectives have not been nearly as 
close as what the EU aimed. Reforms have been on the surface in order to please EU. It is 
true that real changes were made in the post-Arafat era, however there was no enforcement 
of the amelioration of the human rights clause.  
 
It is essential to understand that any EU use of negative conditionality also has impacts on 
Israel or vice-versa. The EU aid transfer to the PA was a way to prevent the authority’s colla
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pse. If collapsed, this would result in large consequences for Israel that would then be faced 
with an even more vulnerable PA and a large humanitarian crisis. This aid from the EU, in 
the view of some, has facilitated Israel to maintain the curfews and borders closed. On the 
eyes of others, the aid could have allowed the sponsoring of suicide bombings. Moreover, if 
the EU were to enforce the human rights clause for the PA, it would mean doing the same 
on the Israeli side and enforcing the illegality if the Israeli barrier/wall or raids in the West 
Bank and Gaza.  
 
The Quartet has a strong position against the transfer of aid to the PA since the 
parliamentary victory of Hamas.   The European Commission had made its standpoint on 
conditionality in the ENP clear stating that “the EU does not seek to impose priorities or 
conditions on its partners…these will be defined by common consent and will thus vary 
from country to country” (European Commission 2004) This statement proves how the 
European Neighborhood Policy can be soft in some instances.   
 
The win of Hamas questions the EU credibility concerning democracy in the MiddleEast. If 
democracy is what the West wants for the Middle East, the Quartet has to be realistic that 
Political Islam is a real and serious movement in the Middle East. It will be quite difficult to 
find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict without the involvement of Islamist groups.  
 
Fatah, the ruling party until recently, had dominated Palestinian politics since 1964. Fatah 
had always seen itself as the only Palestinian government, which has represented the 
Palestinian people and defended their rights. Fatah leaders assumed the support was still 
there after Arafat’s death. However, these elections and the proved that the Palestinian 
people were supporting Fatah because charismatic Arafat was the leader. Losing the 
majority in the second parliamentary elections was a clear message that Fatah was no 
longer the favorite of the Palestinians. 
 
 In the past decades, the people were offered nothing but Fatah. The international arena as 
well as the people of Palestine were dissatisfied. For the first time ever, the January 2006 
elections gave Palestinians real options and a distinct choice between distinct parties. The 
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fake competition that characterized the era of PLO dominance finally came to an end and 
the PA embarked on an era of real competition. The parliamentary elections forced voters to 
make choices between real competitors. Furthermore, the establishment of a multi-party 
system hardens the chances of a party or a couple of parties’ monopoly.   
 
Hamas did not win victory only because of its political Islamist character. There are many 
reasons for the victory. First of all, Palestinians were discontent with Fatah that was not able 
to bring peace and prosperity. Second, Hamas is popular for its generous role as a service 
provider for the communities especially in the austere days of Intifada. Last but not least, 
the Hamas campaign for the elections had a moderate face that did not emphasize on 
Political Islam or armed resistance. 
 
Hamas well prepared for the elections. Firstly, Hamas suggested that would not attack Israel 
as long as Israel ceased the offensive against Palestinian regions. Hamas also prepared a 
very clear proposal explaining the aim of participating in the elections. The document, 
named the ‘Change and Reform List’, focused on the Palestinians’ domestic concerns, as 
well as on corruption, unemployment and security. It also suggested a comprehensive plan 
to reform the Palestinian administration. Hamas avoided mentioning the annihilation of 
Israel but referenced to Islamic law often. (Jerusalem Post, 2006) 
 
The EU might have gained credibility on its contractual ties, however, new problems can 
emerge.  If the EU fears the rise of Political Islam, EU’s aid halting can be an excuse for 
Islamist groups to unite. There are indications that Hamas is exploring the options for 
finding financial assistance elsewhere. First of all, Hamas is not alone. It has been reported 
that the organisation is planning to ask the Arab and Islamic world to support the PA budget 
(UN Division for Palestinian Rights, 2006). It is improbable however, that Arab and Islamic 
governments would pay $1 billion to the PA since they have never been large contributors. 
However, Hamas might have some support from the Gulf states to develop specific 
infrastructure projects. In that case, Iran will be a good option for support of Hamas. Iran 
also could use this as an opportunity to step up and counter the EU and the US on the 
nuclear debate. Iran promised Hamas delegation who visited Iran at the end of February 
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2006 that it would pay $250 million to the new Palestinian government. (UN Division for 
Palestinian Rights, 2006) Hamas has also invited the Arab private sector to invest in the 
West Bank and Gaza. Foreign investors from around the globe have been encouraged to 
invest as well.50 This plan seems doubtful in the short term. However, it might be a 
benefitial second option long-term plan to ameliorate the financial problems and to lose 
decrease on foreign aid. 
 
 
The EU has not been able to profit from active leverage on the PA as in the Central and 
Eastern European countries. The threat to cut financial aid was not enough for the PA to 
manoeuvre the political parties or the people and prevent the victory of the Hamas.  The EU 
political active leverage was actually used was in 2002 in Slovakia. The EU stated that 
Meciar was unacceptable as a Prime Minister, the EU asked the other Slovak parties not to 
form governing coalitions with his party with EU membership at stake. (Vachudova 2005) 
In the case of Turkey, for example, even while the Islamist party was in power, reforms 
were made (Tocci, 2004).  However, there has been low acceptance of Islamist parties in the 
case of the Mashreq countries and the EU has proven to have low leverage on the case of 
the Arab Levant. 
 
The EU leverage on the PA is impaired due to EU-Israeli relations. During the Oslo process, 
little was done in order not to upset the peace process. Following the failure of the process, 
other political considerations have come into play. Most important, EU policies have been 
influenced by Israeli strategies towards the EU. Israel has, at times, criticized Europe for its 
anti-Israeli and anti-Semitism bias. EU member states and particularly countries such as 
Germany and Austria, due to the legacy of World War II, have been highly sensitive to any 
criticism of this kind. A final reason explaining why the Union has largely bent to Israel has 
been the leverage that Israel can exert on Europe. In economic terms, close EU-Israeli trade 
ties have benefited Europe as well as Israel. (Dodini and Fantini 2004). Even more 
importantly, Israel has been key to European security interests for peace and stability in the 
Middle East.   
VI. What does the future hold? 
 
 
The halting of aid to the PA is a catch-22. If the EU does not fulfill its own obligations, 
credibility is impaired. If benefits are not delivered or annuled as described in the 
contractual ties, the EU loses some of its credibility as a global actor. Therefore, the EU had 
to halt aid to the PA in order to maintain its standing. Political imperatives do not appear to 
have significantly hindered the implementation of EU-PA contractual ties. Due to Israeli 
and American preoccupation with Palestinian reform since 2000, as well as Israel’s 
accusations that EU funds had been re-routed to support terrorism, EU institutions have 
gone the extra mile to ensure the full respect of certain conditions under strict monitoring 
and not enforcing other conditions at all. However, with more credibility after the halt of 
aid, the European Union can detriment the economic situation of the PA.    
 
When the concept of a Palestinian state took root in the 1990’s, the focus was on institution-
building in general, rather than on the quality of Palestinian democracy. This was in part 
because of the sui generis nature of the PA. It was also because, due to the fear of disrupting 
the negotiations of the Oslo process, the EU as well as the rest of the Quartet, opted not to 
criticize the parties. Israel was not criticized for its violations of international law and the 
PA for its corruption, human rights violations and authoritarian. (Emerson and Noutcheva 
2005) The EU worried about the Establishment of the Palestinian Authority Central 
Elections Commission. “So far, technical assistance totalling €1.6 million peanuts! has been 
provided to the CEC to build their capacity in terms of financial management, 
administrative procedures, operations, logistics and procurement. A further €10 million 
grant contract was signed in December 2003 for the CEC to cover registration, pre-polling 




The relationship between the EU and the PA appears to be changing. The statement of 
halting of financial assistance to the PA has shown to be a way to pressure change within 
the Hamas government. Since the European Commission announced the halt of aid in April 
2006, after the Hamas victory, there has been no voicing or hints towards the restauration of 
the full aid assistance. However, the EU has not completely frozen the allocations. Due to 
the clear negative impacts of such decision, the EU has been supporting some sectors of the 
Palestinian Authority.   Solely in the months of June and July, two months after the 
announcement of the halt, the EU has transferred at least €190 million for humanitarian aid 
to the PA.  
 
However, the EU does not appear to influence the PA as well as it did during the Fatah 
government. Even though reforms were less than ideal when Fatah was in power, reforms 
were real. Hamas has shown to be more reluctant to apply reforms according to EU norms 
as mentioned in the ENP. It might be early to judge the future of EU leverage on the PA 
formed by a Hamas government. The EU might gain credibility due to the actual appliance 
of the conditionality of the Agreements. The PA may also lose trust on the EU since the halt 
of aid. So far, Hamas has not recognized the state of Israel which is the first demand from 
the EU and the Quartet. The EU has had weak active leverage on Hamas. 
  
 
VII. Conclusion  
 
In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, developments on the ground remain far 
removed from the Union’s stated goals in the Barcelona Process and European 
Neighborhood Policy. Except for the partial successes in  the promotion of Palestinian 
reform, underlying trends are moving steadily away from the EU’s aims concerning the 
establishment of a viable two-state solution and the respect for human rights and 
international law. If promoting democracy was at the top of the list as a main goal, the EU 
has accomplished part of the main goals. However, if democracy in the PA has to follow EU 
democratic norms, the EU cannot even celebrate the promotion of democracy since, 
according to the EU, an Islamist terrorist party is now in power.. While the Union can’t 
alone realize these objectives, the vagueness of the parties’ contractual ties affect 
effectiveness of leverage.  
 
The EU’s ties with Israel and the PA are fundamentally intertwined. With respect to the 
Palestinians, the Union has been increasingly successful in specifying clear conditions for 
the receipt of financial aid and it has become credible in threats to suspend support in the 
event of non-compliance. Key questions remain primarily to the dilemmas of imposing 
conditionality on a non-state actor that depends on Israel. But on a whole, the Union’s 
efforts in this respect have been relatively successful. There are other underlying issues. 
Moreover, if the parties of the agreements find that there are more duties than specified in 
the contract to fulfill in order to receive the benefit, credibility might be harmed.  
 
There is room for manouevre so the EU can find a mid-way between the conditionalities. 
EU membership has been the main driver of domestic reforms in the Central and Eastern 
European countries. The Accession Agreement have promoted faster and more durable 
reforms in the countries that had EU membership perspective. Even some countries that are 
also on the ENP along with the PA, could have membership prospects. The case of the 
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Arab Levant, however, is more unrealistic. The constant changing dynamics of the Arab 
levant politics harden the success of the implementation of agreements. For the PA, at least 
at the present moment, there is no EU membership perspective. Therefore, the EU needs to 
find incentives, additional to direct aid, for the promotion of political and economic 





Asseburg, M., “From Declarations to Implementation: The Three Dimensions of European 
Policy towards the Conflict” in M. Ortega (ed.), The EU and the Crisis in the Middle East, 
Chaillot Paper, EUISS, Paris, pp. 11-26, 2003 
 
Behrendt, S. &  Hanelt, C. (eds.), Bound to Cooperate – Europe and the Middle East, 
Gütersloh, Bertelsmann, 2000 
 
Dodini, M. and M. Fantini, The EU Neighbourhood Policy: Implications for Economic 
Growth and Stability, European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs, July, 2004 
 
Emerson, M. and G. Noutcheva, Europeanisation as a Gravity Model of 
Democratisation,CEPS Working Document No. 214, CEPS, November (retrieved from 
http://www.ceps.be), 2004 
 
Emerson M. and Noutcheva, G. “From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy 
Assessments and Open Issues” CEPS, Brussels, 2005 
 
European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen on 12-
13 December 2002, SN 400/02, 2002b 
 
European Commission, Communication on Wider Europe – Neighbourhood : A New 
Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM 104 final, 
Brussels, 11.3.2003. 
 
European Commission Communication on the European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy 
Paper, COM(2004) 373 final, Brussels, 2004b. 
 
European Commission, Communication on the European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy 
Paper, COM(2004) 373 final, Brussels, 12.5.2004, p. 8., 2004d 
 
European Commission, “Proposed EU-Israel Action Plan”, Brussels, 9.12.2004 (retrieved 
from http://www.europa.eu.int)., 2004e 
 
European Commission, “Proposed EU-PA Action Plan”, Brussels, 9.12.2004, pp. 3-8 
(retrieved from http://www.europa.eu.in, 2004f 
 
 26 
European Commission, “The EU Relations with West Bank and Gaza Strip”, 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/gaza/intro/index.htm#1.2 Brussels,  December, 
2005 
 
Fowkes, Ben . Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Communist World . New York: 
Palgrave, 2002. 
 
Grabbe, H., “How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, 
Diffusion and Diversity”, Journal of European Public Policy Vol. 8, No. 6 , pp. 1013-1031, 
2001 
 
Human Rights Watch , Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks against Israeli 
Citizens, HRW, New York, October, 2002 
 




Keukeleire, S., The EU as a Diplomatic Actor, Discussion Paper No. 71, University of 
Leicester, 2000 
 
Palestine Media Centre, “PNA: Israel Cannot Have both Settlements and Peace – Israeli 
Housing Minister: Gaza Jewish Settlers Could Move to West Bank”, PMC, 16 February 
2005 
 
Pridham, Geoffrey. “EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post Communist 
States: Formality and Reality.” Journal of Common Market Studies 953-973, 2002 
 
Sadurski, Wojciech. "Accession's democracy dividend: the impact of the EU enlargement 
upon democracy in the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe", European law 
journal, Vol. 10, Issue 4, p371, ISSN: 1351-5993, 2003 
 
Sayigh, Y. and K. Shikaki, Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions, Task Force Report, 
Council of Foreign Relations, New York, 1999 
 
Schimmelfenig, F.and Engert, S. and Knobel,H. "Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The 
Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey." JCMS 41.3: 
495-518, 2003 
 
Smith, K., “The use of political conditionality in the EU’s relations with third countries: 
How 
effective?”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 3, pp. 253-74. (1998) 
 
Tocci, Natalie. Comparing the Role of the EU in the Turkish-Kurdish and Israeli-
Palestinian Conflicts.  Working Paper n. 221, Brussels, 2001  
 
 27 
Tocci, N., Conflict Resolution in the European Neighbourhood: The Role of the EU as a 
Framework and as an Actor, EUI Working Paper No. 2004/29, RSCAS, Florence. 2004. 
 
United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights, “Chronological Review of Events Related 




U.S. State Department website, September 24, 2003 
 http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2003/24622.htm 
 
Vachudova, Milada. Europe Undivided. Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
